Japan’s Three Options in the East China Sea

Amid heightened tensions with China over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in 2012, Robert Dujarric outlines three broad strategies Japan could adopt. The first option is a hardline approach: bolstering military deterrence and refusing any compromise – essentially meeting Chinese challenges head-on. This would signal strength but risks military escalation and further damaging relations with Beijing. The second option is diplomatic compromise: for instance, reviving proposals for joint resource development or tacitly agreeing to shelve the sovereignty issue. Such a conciliatory stance could reduce tensions and stabilize ties, but it might be seen domestically as sacrificing Japan’s claim and possibly embolden China elsewhere.

The third option is status quo management: Japan could continue its current policy of administrating the islands while responding calmly to Chinese incursions, aiming to prevent clashes without making concessions – in effect, muddling through in hopes the dispute cools over time. Dujarric weighs that while this avoids immediate confrontation or concession, it means enduring a prolonged period of strain and the constant risk of incidents at sea. He doesn’t prescribe a single “correct” choice, but by sketching these options, the article illuminates Japan’s difficult strategic calculus: balancing firmness with prudence to safeguard its interests in the East China Sea.