Popular geopolitical commentary loves historical analogy—but not all comparisons are created equal.

Abe Shinzo’s agenda leans heavily into nostalgic nationalism, but does little to prepare Japan for looming challenges ahead.

Japan’s government has publicly and frequently apologized for the evils of the Showa Era. Unfortunately, frequent statements…minimizing the extent of war crimes seriously undermined the credibility of its apologies.

Without a more globally adept workforce, Japan risks falling behind — yet the path to ‘globalize’ its insular labor pool will not come cheap or easy.

Japan’s handling of the ‘history issue’ is relevant to American interests in Asia… Anti-Japanese feelings, inflamed every time a politician denies the comfort women, make it harder for the U.S. to manage its alliances.

Abe’s strong alliance stance makes him a valuable U.S. partner, but his nationalist agenda sometimes complicates Washington’s diplomacy in Asia.

The deepening Sino-Japanese rift is effectively an open challenge to America’s position in Asia, forcing Washington to reconcile its treaty commitments with avoiding conflict.

Co-authors Dujarric and Shin Woon observe signs that Japan is becoming more inward-focused economically (fewer Japanese studying abroad, low foreign direct investment, closed job market). They warn that this “virtual Berlin Wall” around Japan is isolating it just as the rest of Asia globalizes, risking future stagnation.

Robert Dujarric argues that the ongoing dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands has escalated beyond Prime Minister Abe’s bilateral influence, driven instead by domestic political pressures in China and the nationalist sentiment in Japan. He contends that neither side’s leadership can unilaterally resolve the standoff without risking domestic backlash.

Japan essentially has three choices in handling the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute: escalate, acquiesce, or manage the status quo – each with distinct risks.

A virtual ‘Berlin Wall’ surrounds Japan, growing ever-more solid as the world moves in the opposite direction.

Dujarric examines China’s shift toward more welcoming FDI policies in 2011, highlighting regulatory reforms, establishment of free-trade zones, and incentives for high-tech and services sectors.

In this piece, Dujarric critiques the perception within some Chinese policymaking circles that international relations are strictly zero-sum, where one country’s gain is another’s loss.

Dujarric analyzes the potential fallout if Bahrain’s sectarian tensions lead to widespread unrest. He warns that instability could disrupt oil flows, test Gulf Cooperation Council solidarity, and draw in regional rivals like Iran and Saudi Arabia.

Co-authored with Andy Zelleke, Dujarric argues that the U.S. could leverage support for an Israeli preventive strike on Iran’s nuclear sites by conditioning it on renewed progress toward a Palestinian state.

As Japan grays and its population shrinks, a controlled influx of immigrants could provide the youthful labor and innovation needed to keep the nation afloat.

Japan has built walls — linguistic, cultural, regulatory — that shut out foreign ideas and talent. Those walls must come down if Japan is to truly thrive in a global era.

President Obama’s initiative to eliminate nuclear weapons culminated in the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit, uniting 47 nations to commit to securing and reducing vulnerable nuclear materials worldwide.

At West Point in December 2009, President Obama announced a surge of 30,000 additional U.S. troops to Afghanistan—aiming to reverse Taliban gains and train local security forces.

Robert Dujarric argues that the key to reducing U.S. greenhouse‐gas emissions lies not in new technology mandates but in changing how Americans discuss energy and security.